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This paper studies the labour productivity divergence in the Euro Area by scrutinizing the
link between the low interest rate environment, the widening productivity gap between periph-
ery and core countries and the lower growth of the Monetary Union. It makes use of firm-level
data to apply a mechanism rooted in the dynamic competition literature and to assess to what
extent an unequal distribution of frontier and non-frontier firms across the Eurozone might be
the reason why Southern countries are still lagging behind. The evidence presented suggests
that low long-term interest rates might be enlarging their distance to the Euro frontier.
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1 Introduction
Since its beginning, the European Economic and Monetary Union has been marked by a divergence
between labour productivity levels of core and periphery countries (Lains, 2019). Panel (a) of
Figure 1 shows how the productivity gap between Germany and Italy, a core and a periphery country
respectively, has increased since the Euro project took off. Furthermore, since the turning of the
century, the lack of convergence within the Euro Area came along with a gradual worsening of the
relative growth performance of the block as whole. As shown by panel (b) of the same figure, and
as documented in the literature, Europeans have seen their productivity gap to the US enlarged in
the last two decades (Buiatti et al., 2017).
Figure 1: GDP per hour worked: US 2010 dollars, 2000 – 2018






(a) Core vs Periphery







(b) US vs Euro Area
Source: OECD (2020), GDP per hour worked (indicator).
Another key feature of the monetary union should also be noted: the low interest rate environ-
ment. Long-term interest rates have been falling across the union since its formation, as exhibited
in Figure 2, with an even steeper reduction after 2010. Lower interest rates, in particular long-term
measures, are traditionally seen as having expansionary effects on economic growth. The reasoning
behind the traditional view is that, for lower levels of the interest rate, the current value of future
gains increases relatively to the costs of investing at time t, thus encouraging investment.
Nevertheless, the coexistence in the last decade of the three phenomenons mentioned raises
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Figure 2: Long-term Interest Rate - Euro Area




Source: European Central Bank - Statistical Data Warehouse.
an important question: can the low interest rate environment be driving the labour productivity
divergence in the Eurozone?
In this regard, a mechanism advanced by Liu et al. (2019) stands out. The authors propose a
model based on dynamic competition between duopolist firms, where extremely low interest rates
can cause a widening of the productivity gap between leaders and followers, while giving rise to a
decrease in aggregate growth. Since the model is only empirically applied to the US, it becomes of
interest to evaluate to which degree its conclusions match the empirical evidence of the Eurozone.
Therefore, the contribution of this study relies on empirically assessing if the mechanism in
Liu et al. (2019) is present in the Eurozone, while attempting to unveil how low interest rates,
productivity gaps and low aggregate growth may be intertwined in the block. What is more, taking
advantage of the firm-level data provided by Bureau van Dijk, it sheds light on the EA divergence
debate, a topic typically discussed at the sectoral or macro level, by scrutinizing the dynamics of
this period at the firm stratum.
By supposing that under the European Single Market firms can trade freely with entities of any
of the countries in study, while being backed by the common currency, the hypothesis is tested
at the country and at the Eurozone level. The results indicate that the asymmetric effects of the
interest rate might have a role in explaining the core and periphery divergence, even though not all
of the additional predictions of the model are confirmed by the data.
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The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature and
3 explains the details of the model, while section 4 relates it to the Euro Area. Section 5 describes
the data and variables used, followed by sections 6 and 7 that explain the methodology. Sections 8
and 9 present the results for the main hypothesis and associated predictions, whereas 10 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis
2.1 Labour productivity divergence in the Euro Area
There is a large body of literature aimed at explaining the divergence in the productivity gains
between European economies associated with the worsening of the economic performance of the
block. Focusing on the Eurozone, Irac and Lopez (2015) identifies two clusters among the EA-
121 economies: the ”South Countries Group”, composed by Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain,
commonly referred to in the literature as ”Periphery countries”, and the ”Other Countries Group”
- the ”Core” (Friesenbichler and Glocker, 2019). The paper finds evidence in support of between
clusters’ structural divergence and draws attention to the difference between core and periphery
economies regarding innovation indicators, warning that the divergence in R&D investment could
be particular worrisome for periphery economies.
Sondermann (2014) uses sectoral data from the EU KLEMS database to test for productivity
convergence between the EA-12 countries. Regarding the drivers of the divergence, the author
draws attention to the role of three areas: education of the work force, R&D investment and regu-
lation, proxied by the indicator provided by the Fraser Institute. As in Friesenbichler and Glocker
(2019), several other studies have pointed out the role of institutional factors, assessing the role
of corruption, regulation, rule of law or policy effectiveness, with measures sourced, for instance,
from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators database (Sondermann, 2014; Andrews et al.,
2016; Irac and Lopez, 2015). Furthermore, Irac and Lopez (2015) provides evidence in favour of a
divergence in terms of the quality of institutions, which reinforces the role that these factors might
1BE, DE, IE, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI.
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be playing.
Another stream in the literature focuses on models of structural transformation and sectoral
heterogeneity between eurozone economies (Mongelli et al., 2017). Friesenbichler and Glocker
(2019) contributes to the debate with a tradable-non-tradable approach. The authors demonstrate
that, between 1999 and 2015, core countries maintained their share of tradable and non-tradable
goods production fairly constant, while periphery countries saw the share of non-tradable goods
increase significantly until 2008. Given the unsustainable sectoral composition of these economies
before the crisis, these were the ones which suffered the most serious recessions and the ones where
the replacement of the production of non-tradables took place. The authors argue that the tradable
sector is of higher importance for aggregate productivity and, for that reason, the way production is
divided in tradable and non-tradable goods is crucial for economic catch-up. According to this rea-
soning, structural change towards the tradable-sector fosters convergence, and periphery economies
would benefit from reallocating their production away from the non-tradable sector.
Nonetheless, the main culprits identified in the literature when it comes to common currency
associated factors can be divided into three categories: capital misallocation, labour misallocation
and the scale effect (Bagnai and Ospina, 2018). Bagnai and Ospina (2018) study the importance of
the three effects for the productivity dynamics of 27 sectors in France, Germany, Italy and Spain
from 1986 until 2014. Using the real interest rate as a proxy for capital misallocation, the real
effective exchange rate to measure the scale effect and the ”strictness of employment protection” as
an indicator of the role of labour market reforms, the authors estimate an Autoregressive distributed
lag model with a pooled mean group estimator (ARDL-PMG) and show that the three effects have
had a significant role on reinforcing divergence dynamics among the four economies.
Within the capital misallocation view, Gopinath et al. (2017) focuses on firm-level data (ORBIS)
for European manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2012 to examine the capital allocation effect.
With a model with heterogeneous firms, financial frictions that depend on firm size and capital
adjustment costs, the authors demonstrate that the decline in the real interest rate has led Southern
countries to experience larger increases in dispersion of the marginal rate of return to capital and
5
to lower total factor productivity. Since core firms tend to have access to more developed financial
markets, the TFP losses due to misallocation are not observed in northern countries, reinforcing
the idea that the capital misallocation effect is particularly relevant in southern countries, where the
large capital inflows following the adoption of the euro seem to have been directed at less efficient,
but with higher net worth, firms.
2.2 Interest rate and the single market hypothesis
The productivity slowdown is not a unique feature of Euro Area economies and, as Liu et al.
(2019) argue, its persistence suggests that a common factor with long-term effects at the global
scale should be driving it. Liu et al. (2019) model the consequences of low interest rates for market
competition, thus presenting a different mechanism through which the decrease in interest rates
can induce lower productivity growth: a strategic behaviour. The paper studies how investment
incentives are shaped by interest rate developments and how leaders and followers are differently
affected according to the level of the interest rate. Therefore, the presence of the traditional expan-
sionary effect of monetary policy ease is combined with a contractionary impact, culminating in an
inverted-U relationship between interest rates and productivity growth.
Besides the productivity slowdown associated with ultra low interest rates, the model yields a
series of predictions regarding the increase in the productivity gap between leaders and followers,
also foreseeing a rise in market concentration and markups, along with a decline in business dy-
namism. The plausibility of the model is backed by findings in the literature that indicate a widen
productivity gap to the global frontier and a reduction of market competition in OECD economies
(Andrews et al., 2016). Moreover, Liu et al. (2019) apply the model to high-frequency US data and
demonstrate that a decline in the long-term rate from an already low level of this variable is more
beneficial to leaders than followers, thus validating the main conclusion of the model. The next




The model nests within a two players dynamic game with à la Bertrand competition. To introduce
the productivity gap component in the framework, profits are assumed to depend not on the produc-
tivity level of a firm, but on the productivity gap between the two players. As a consequence, the
productivity gap becomes a state variable s whose path shapes the degree of market dynamism. As
long as this gap s is above 0, the market will feature a leader, with profits equal to πs, and a follower,
whose profits are denoted by π−s. In addition, although a greater s results in superior profits at the
aggregate level, it will also mean a more unequal distribution between the participants, which will
evidently benefit the leader.
3.2 Investment Decisions
To improve its productivity, a firm can invest up to η in each state s. Furthermore, investment is
associated with a marginal cost of c. Thus, in each state, a firm will decide its level of investment,
ηs, which will be between [0,η ], and will spend a total of c×ηs. In turn, the productivity gap
s(t +∆), where ∆ denotes time after moment t, will evolve in the following way:
• s will increase by one step with a probability of ∆ ·ηs;
• s will decrease by one step with a probability of ∆ · (κ +η−s);
• s will remain unchanged otherwise.
The parameter κ models exogenous technology diffusion and might be interpreted as the rate
of patent expiration. Thus, introducing κ adds to the model an exogenous Poisson rate at which the
laggard converges with the frontier.
The determinants of s clearly show how investment decisions become strategic. By increasing
investment, a firm can expand or shorter the productivity gap of the next state. If s increases, the
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follower will need additional steps to reach the leader, perpetuating the leading position of the
latter. A decrease in s enables the follower to get closer and eventually catch up with the frontier.
Thus, players invest not only to increase productivity and obtain higher profits at a later stage, but
more importantly to consolidate or improve their position in the market. The latter motive, labelled
strategic incentive, will allow for even greater profits in subsequent states.
The long-term interest rate r becomes relevant in the model since forward looking firms will
take decisions by maximising the present discounted value of future payoffs, net of investment





e−rτ {π(t + τ)− c(t + τ)}|s
]
(1)
For a given interest rate r, the set of value functions and investment decisions {ηs,η−s,υsυ−s,}∞s=0
that satisfy 7 and 8 constitute the symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. The Hamil-
ton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for each firm are presented in Appendix A.
Regarding the impact of the interest rate in the model, as the traditional view in the literature
implies, a decrease in the long-term interest rate level has expansionary consequences for invest-
ment. When future profits are discounted at lower rates, the present value of future returns become
relatively higher when compared to the costs of investing. According to this line of reasoning,
investment and, as a consequence, growth should increase after a decrease in r.
Nonetheless, Liu et al. (2019) shed light on a contractionary effect brought by the interest rate
decline from an already low level: a strategic effect caused by forward-looking firms who decide
investment taking into consideration the impact their actions will have on future competition and
market shares.
For sufficient low levels of the interest rate, and as the leader becomes infinitely patient, the
strategic and anti-competitive effect of the decrease of interest rate will dominate the expansionary
one. This happens because the leader will get stronger incentives to invest. As r decreases, the
leaders has not only a lot to win by gaining more market share, but above all, it has a lot to lose with
a reduction in s. A market leader that falls from the monopolistic to the competitive region would
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experience a drop in firm value, that would be higher the lower the interest rate gets. Therefore, to
protect the proximity it has to high profit states, a leader will engage in an aggressive investment
behaviour, with the aim of ruling out the chance of the follower ever closing the gap and overcoming
it. It is important to note that the assumptions of the model imply that followers will only invest
while reaching high-states and receiving the associated high profits is possible. If investing does not
bring the possibility of a reduction in s because of the aggressive behaviour of the leader, laggards
will settle and stop investing, since they have no chance of improving their profits.
The negative consequences for aggregate investment and growth are not reduced to the fact
that followers cease to invest. As the leader reaches a sufficiently secure position, it will also
stop investing, since the investment cost is higher than the marginal benefit brought by being one
step ahead of a very lagged competitor. Whether or not the contractionary effect dominates the
traditional one, is determined by the level of the interest rate. Thus, the model predicts an inverted-
U relationship between economic growth and the interest rate.
The next section presents the predictions of Liu et al. (2019) regarding the environment where
the long-term interest rate is low enough to allow for the contractionary effect to become dominant.
3.3 Model Predictions
Proposition 1: As the interest rate converges to zero:
1. All markets move from the competitive to the monopoly region;
2. The productivity gap between frontier and laggard firms increases;
3. The ratio of aggregate investment to GDP reduces;
4. The growth rate of aggregate productivity decreases;
5. Industry leaders become the only players in the market, obtaining large profits and mark-ups;
6. Market dynamism reduces and leader’s status become permanent;
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7. The market valuation of leaders increases relatively to the value of follower firms.
Proposition 1 implies that, as the interest rate decreases and becomes closer to zero, followers
cease investment and leaders only invest to offset the exogenous technology diffusion, causing a
decline in aggregate investment and productivity growth.
Proposition 2: As the interest rate converges to 0, the relative valuation response between
leaders and followers increases and diverges to infinity.
4 The Euro Area through the Lens of This Model
The model by Liu et al. (2019) introduces a novel mechanism that establishes a long-run relation-
ship between low levels of the interest rate, low productivity growth and increasing productivity
gaps, which is precisely what has been happening in the Euro Area. The explanation for the inter-
action between the three does not rely on zero lower bound or price stickiness as in other branches
of the literature (Moran and Queralto, 2018), but on a dynamic game between forward-looking
duopolists.
With the euro as a common currency and under the European Single market, the Euro Area
emerges as a candidate to test the plausibility of this model since firms can freely compete across
countries while benefiting from a fixed exchange rate. What is more, applying this mechanism
to the common market makes one wonder if an unequal distribution of frontier and laggard firms
across countries might explain why the periphery is still lagging behind. This is the hypothesis that
will be addressed in the remaining sections.
5 Data and Variables of Interest
This study will follow a firm-level approach to study not only whether the divergence between
EA countries could be connected with the low interest rate environment, but also if the lack of
macro convergence also reflects on significant differences at the company stratum. The firm-level
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databases compiled by Bureau van Dijk, a Moody’s Analytics company focused on private enter-
prise data, provide a tool to bring the debate around the productivity divergence in the Euro Area,
which has traditionally focused on country and sectoral data, to a more disaggregated view.
The analysis will cover the period from 2009 until 2018 and the following countries: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Firm-level data for Portugal is
sourced from the Financials dataset of Sabi, a database from Bureau van Dijk. The information for
the other countries is obtained in the Financials dataset of Amadeus, also from Bureau van Dijk,
via the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In terms of industries, the firms kept belong to
the sectors with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the European
Classification of Economic Activities system NACE Rev. 2. Thus, the analysis excludes primary
sector activities, financial services and public services. Since the financial databases only provide
annual data, this analysis will focus on the predictions that have implications on an annual basis.
This will restrict the study to the implications of Proposition 1.
Variable transformations, computations, data filtering and cleaning will follow mostly Gal
(2013), and a detailed description of the variables used can be found in Appendix C. Nominal
variables are deflated at the 2 digit industry level using OECD detailed National Accounts data and
expressed in 2015 euros.
Due to missing data, the sample becomes less representative in terms of firms and countries after
data treatment. To correct for that, all the averages in the empirical results sections are weighted
by the share of the countries in the initial sample available in the Financials database of Amadeus.
Also due to the low representativeness of small firms in the dataset, only firms with at least 20
employees will be part of the final sample.
5.1 Productivity
First and foremost, productivity will be measured primarily by Multi-factor productivity (MFP) and
expressed in log terms. In additional tests, Value Added per worker will also be used as a measure of
labour productivity. Multi-factor productivity will be estimated using a Cobb-Douglas production
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function based on value added and with the number of employees and real capital stock as inputs,
having as reference the work by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). As proposed by Wooldridge (2009),
the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin approach estimates the production function by using intermediate
inputs, in this case materials, as a proxy for unobserved productivity. Furthermore, twice lagged
values of labour act as instruments for the variable, addressing the identification issues regarding
βl raised by Ackerberg et al. (2015). Production functions will be estimated at the eurozone level
but separately for each two digit NACE industry, controlling for country and year fixed effects. Not
estimating production functions separately for each EA member allows for the comparison of MFP
measures across the Eurozone.
5.2 Productivity Frontier
The frontier at time t includes the top 5% of the estimated multi-factor productivity distribution for
each two digit sector. Since the total number of firms available varies from year to year, using a
measure that depends solely on the absolute number of firms per period could potentially underes-
timate the value of the frontier when the amount of firms available is much larger than the median.
To circumvent this issue and prevent laggards from ascending to the top in these times, we compute
the median total number of companies across the period and use this measure to find a fixed size
for the frontier set. Therefore, the 5% of this median will the proxy for 5% top of the productiv-
ity distribution. It is important to note that, although the number of firms is fixed overtime, the
composition of the frontier is allowed to change. ”Laggard firms” is composed by all the other
companies.
Having identified the group of leaders, the productivity frontier value at time t in industry s will
be the unweighted average of the Multi-factor productivity of the companies that belong to the set
of leaders. As Griffith et al. (2004) highlight, using this measure instead of the value of the firm




The main outcome of interest will be the Multi-factor Productivity Gap between frontier and lag-
gard firms, which will measure the distance of a firm to the market leaders. Since MFP is expressed
in log terms, the same will apply to the gap variable, computed in the following way:
Gapisct = MFPFst−MFPisct (2)
In equation 2, MFPFst denotes the technology frontier of sector s at time t, and is unique at the
country or at the single market level.
5.4 Real Interest Rate
The main independent variable, the long-term real interest rate, will be proxied by the difference
between the annual frequency transformation of 10-year government bonds and the annual inflation
rate for each country. All nominal long-term interest rates, including the nominal index for the
Eurozone, are sourced from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank.
6 Empirical Framework
This section presents the methodology used to test the main hypothesis: the low interest rate envi-
ronment might have a contractionary effect by discouraging competition, which could explain not
only part of the productivity slowdown of the Eurozone, but also the increasing divergence between
the core and the periphery of the union. The mechanism can operate in the context of the Euro Area
in two ways: at the country or at the single market level. Nonetheless, the predictions of Liu et al.
(2019) imply that the negative effect of the interest rate is only present for sufficiently low levels
of the variable. Thus, finding the mechanism at the country level does not imply nor rule out the
presence of the contractionary effect of the interest rate at the Eurozone level, or vice-versa. The
interest rate might already have crossed the threshold in one, in both or in none of the cases.
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6.1 Country Level
For country level tests, contrasting the effect in Italy and Germany becomes of interest not only due
to the different paths of the long term government yields of the two countries2, but also because
they might as well be the two most common choices to represent each of the opposite sides in the
literature, with Italy on the periphery and Germany on the core side. Individual tests will also be
extended to Portugal, whose poor growth performance after joining the Monetary Union clashes
with the convergence expectations that many had before the turning of the century (Lains, 2019).
Considering the high level of disaggregation of the panel, the baseline model will include firm-
specific effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms that could potentially bias the
results (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The resulting fixed effects model is:
Gapist = αi +β1Xist +β2CountryRt +β3EuroAreaRt +Dt + εist (3)
In equation 3, αi are firm fixed effects and Xist denote the firm-level controls, namely firm age
and its squared term, number of employees and turnover. The last two covariates are taken in logs.
CountryRt is the real long-term interest rate of the country in question, while EuroAreaRt is the
indicator for the real long-term interest rate in the Eurozone. Lastly, Dt are year dummies and εist
is the idiosyncratic error. Errors are clustered at the industry level to allow for correlation between
firms in the same sector. Clustering only at the firm level would assume all firms are independent,
which could lead to erroneous inference.
When dealing with annual data, it is very likely that firms have time to make decisions, invest
and see the consequences of their investment reflected in the market within the same period in
which monetary policy changes take place. Nonetheless, the model assumes that even though firms
make investment decisions at state s based on the information available at that time, market changes
will only be felt in the next state, when the new productivity gap of s+1 is known. Therefore, to
control for potential endogeneity, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
2Annual 10-year real interest rates in Germany ranged from -1.5 to 3.02 in the period, whereas the Italian ranged
between 0.81 and 3.51.
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Regarding robustness, the Hausman test is performed in each case to assess whether the random
effects is the efficient estimator or if, on the contrary, it would be inappropriate to use it due to the
existence of non-random and unobserved firm-specific effects. Finally, since the decisions of firms
may depend on unobserved factors that are correlated across time, the Arellano-Bond estimator will
address potential issues of serial correlation in the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman,
2009).
6.2 Single Market Context
As in the baseline model for country level tests, the preferred specification for the Eurozone will
also include firm fixed effects. Nonetheless, another key issue ought to be accounted for when
working with the full dataset. Due to missing data, the sample becomes less representative in terms
of firms across countries after treatment and filtering. For that reason, the regression will account
for the weights of each country in the initial sample, ensuring that the estimates are not driven by
the over or under representativeness of a certain nationality.
The goal in this new context is to first see if the effect is acting in the Euro Area as a common
market, without accounting for country level factors. Thus, the baseline model becomes:
Gapisct = αi +β1Xisct +β3EuroAreaRt +Dt + εisct (4)
As a starting point to see if differences in productivity exist across countries, figure 3 compares
the share of firms that belong to the European frontier in each country in selected years. As a
second step, we attempt to disentangle the common market effects from the country ones, by adding
country factors:
Gapisct = αi +β1Xisct +β2Xsct +β3Xct +β4EuroAreaRt +β5Pc +Dt + εisct (5)
Comparing to equation 4, country level covariates Xct are introduced to account for the differ-
ent characteristics of the countries. The variables chosen to control for institutional and regulatory
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differences are the ”Legal system and property rights” and ”Regulation” indicators of the Fraser In-
stitute. Given the multilevel structure of the data, sectoral concentration measures for each country
are included in Xsct as sector level covariates for a specific country. To assess whether belonging
to a periphery or a core country have different effects on the distance of a firm to the euro frontier,
one can introduce a dummy variable Pc that equals 1 if the country is classified as a periphery EA
member in the literature. Even though the coefficient of this variable cannot be computed with the
within estimator, the System Arellano-Bond estimator is capable of doing it, by only including this
variable in the level equation and not in the differenced one. Thus, with this method, one is still
able to study the impact of time-invariant variables while still controlling for firm fixed effects and
serial correlation in the residuals.
For robustness, both models will be estimated with the within estimator to control for firm-
specific heterogeneity unless the Hausman test proves otherwise. Furthermore, as discussed in
section 6.1, all variables will be instrumented for with its own lagged values and, if needed, serial
correlation in all specifications will be corrected with the System GMM.
7 Methodology for Additional Predictions
Besides the impact of a decrease of the interest rate on the MFP gap, section 3.3 presents a set of
additional predictions that would help validate the model. Taking advantage of the firm level data,
this analysis begins by comparing productivity growth rates of frontier and laggard firms. Next,
the evolution of capital stock and MFP will also be compared, to assess whether one of them has
a bigger importance as a driver of the productivity gap. The bulk of this section explains the more
elaborate steps taken to study the possible additional consequences for the economy.
7.1 Consequences for sectoral productivity
Point 4. of Prediction 1 entails that industries where the aggregate productivity is falling the most
are the industries where the productivity gap between leaders and followers is rising the most. To
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evaluate if MFP divergence within a sector affects productivity growth in that sector as a whole, the
industry MFP growth is regressed on the lagged value of the average productivity gap of laggard
firms. As robustness check, the Arellano–Bond estimator is also computed.
7.2 Follower catch-up
The increase in leadership persistence foreseen by point 6. would imply that, as the productivity
gap increases, it gets harder and harder for the follower to converge. However, the literature of neo-
Schumpeterian growth theory argues the opposite. Due to knowledge diffusion and technology
spillovers, the more a firm is behind the frontier, the more it should grow when compared to the
average growth rate of the sector (Aghion et al., 2013). In line with this literature, Griffith et al.
(2004) study the latter hypothesis and present evidence in favour of productivity catch-up with the
frontier. Following this literature, an Error Correction Model, where productivity growth of non-
frontier firms depends mainly on the distance to the frontier, will be estimated. As in Andrews
et al. (2016), an interaction term between the gap and a time period will be added to the baseline
specification so as to evaluate whether the pace of convergence has increased or decreased over
time. The baseline model to be tested empirically will account for firm level fixed effects and will
be the following:






t +δ4Xisct + γi +δct + εisct (6)
As in previous models, Xisct is the set of firm level covariates and lagged values of all variables
control for potential endogeneity. D jt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year belong to
the j period. In this case, three periods will be considered: 2009-2012, 2013-2015 and 2016-
2018. γi are firm fixed effects and δct includes country*time dummies to control for technology and
macroeconomic innovations that may impact all firms within the same country and year. Lastly,
errors are clustered at the industry and country level. This way, it is assumed that the errors are
independent across industries and countries, which allows the error term to be correlated across
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firms within the same sector and country.
Without further controls, the coefficient on gapisct−1 is expected to be positive as in the litera-
ture. Nonetheless, if decreasing the long-term interest rate has a negative impact on the growth of
a non-frontier, then the coefficient on gapisct−1 should increase after controlling for it.
7.3 Market dynamism and concentration
Points 1., 5. and 6. of Proposition 1 focus on the degree of concentration and dynamism of the
market. Firstly, leadership persistence is studied by computing the share of frontier firms at time t
that were at the top of the MFP distribution two years earlier.
Secondly, an idea of entry and exit dynamics can be obtained by plotting the share of firms by
age across the sample. Firms will be allocated into age categories in accordance with Andrews et al.
(2016). The groups are the following: young firms, mature firms, non-viable old firms (with at least
two consecutive years of negative profits) and viable old firms. Since the model predicts a reduction
on the degree of business dynamism, one should expect to see a decrease in the share of young firms.
Regarding non-viable old firms, or zombie firms as referred in the literature (Banerjee and Hofmann,
2018), two hypothesis can be advanced. The share of non-profitable old firms can increase as these
companies reduce investment, productivity and, as a consequence, experience profit losses. Some
studies have argued that low interest rates have lead to the increasing prevalence of mature firms
with negative profits over consecutive periods (Banerjee and Hofmann, 2018). However, these
firms will only persist in the market if the banking sector provides the necessary credit support
(Acharya et al., 2019). If non-profitable and highly indebted companies saw their access to credit
halted in the period and had to declare bankruptcy, the data might show a reduction of the share of
zombie firms.
Lastly, concentration measures will follow Bruno et al. (2019) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015)
and equal the market share in terms of operating revenue (or turnover) of the top 4 (MS4) or 8
(MS8) firms in the industry. To study how the indicators evolve over time, the separate averages for
the manufacturing and services sectors are presented.
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7.4 Investment
Prediction of point 3. foresees a decrease in sectoral investment to GDP ratio as low interest
rates reach values close to zero. In the model, this stems from the growing difference between
the incentives of leaders and followers to invest. As the productivity gap between leaders and
followers increases, the likelihood that followers are able to reach a leadership position decreases,
which decreases their incentives to invest in order to surpass the frontier firm. This reasoning
originates three conclusions that should be present in the data for the model to hold.
First, investment by leaders should be rising faster than the one by laggards, which can be as-
sessed by comparing growth rates of the investment to value added ratio in the two cases. Second,
an increase in the gap between leaders and followers should also lead to an increase in the invest-
ment gap between them. Lastly, as the investment gap widens, investment to GDP ratio should
decrease at the sectoral level. The last two statements will be tested by first correlating the two
gaps, and then regressing the Sectoral Investment to Value Added Ratio on the lagged value of the
investment to value added ratio gap variable and on the lagged MFP gap.
8 Empirical Results
8.1 Country Level
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the empirical results for the main hypothesis at the country level. Specifi-
cation tests and robustness details are explained in Appendix D.1. When comparing the coefficients
on the country-specific real Interest Rate obtained with the fixed and System GMM estimators in
the three tables, one concludes that the sign of the coefficients of the two Southern countries are
the symmetric of the German one. While a decrease in the interest rate for the periphery countries
could reduce the MFP gap within the country, the same drop in the long term government bonds
would mean an increase in the distance to the frontier of German followers within national borders.
Nonetheless, the fact that the coefficients regarding their own government yields are positive for
Italy and Portugal could mean, according to the reasoning of the model, that these variables have
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Table 1: Interest Rate Effect at the Country Level - Portugal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gapist Gapist Gapist Gapist
PortugalRt−1 0.00248 -0.00104 0.00349 0.00703
(0.59) (-0.23) (1.00) (1.50)
EuroAreaRt−1 -0.0327+ -0.00504 -0.0456∗ 0.00179
(-1.84) (-0.50) (-2.37) (0.18)
Gapist−1 0.186∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(3.85) (3.99)
Estimator Within Multilevel RE Within System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects - No - -
N 78759 78759 78759 78759
R2 0.045 0.074
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Clustered Standard Errors at the
2 digit industry level. All regressions include firm age and size (turnover and employment) controls.
not reached a sufficiently low level for the contractionary effect to dominate the expansionary one.
Long-term interest rates in Germany are indeed much lower than the ones experienced in the other
two countries3, which helps to support the conclusion of the model: the mechanism only operates
for sufficiently low levels of the monetary variable.
Table 2: Interest Rate Effect at the Country Level - Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gapist Gapist Gapist Gapist
GermanyRt−1 -0.0409∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗ -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(-3.70) (-3.48) (-7.85) (-8.88)
EuroAreaRt−1 0 0.101∗∗∗ 0 0.474∗∗∗
(.) (5.89) (.) (8.10)
Gapist−1 0.273∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(5.41) (6.49)
Estimator Within Multilevel RE Within System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects - No - -
N 64712 64712 64712 64712
R2 0.113 0.186
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Clustered Standard Errors at the
2 digit industry level. All regressions include firm age and size (turnover and employment) controls.
Including the EuroAreaRt−1 variable in the regressions also allows to control for possible non-
linear effects of the long-term interest rate, since the values for this indicator are higher than the
3Annual 10-year real interest rates in Germany ranged between -1.5 and 3.02 in the period, while the Portuguese
and the Italian from 0.64 to 7.75 and 0.81 to 3.51, respectively.
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German real interest rate, but lower than the other two economies. For instance, the positive coef-
ficient on EuroAreaRt−1 in specification (3) of table 2 might indicate that, for higher values of the
long-term interest rate, the expansionary effect could again become dominant in Germany. Since, in
general, the sign of the same coefficient is negative for periphery countries, the opposite reasoning
applies: lower base values of the interest rate could in turn imply within country divergence.
Table 3: Interest Rate Effect at the Country Level - Italy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gapist Gapist Gapist Gapist
ItalyRt−1 0.00468 0.00598 0.0194∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.71) (2.34) (4.56)
EuroAreaRt−1 0 -0.0252∗∗ 0 -0.0538∗∗∗
(.) (-2.89) (.) (-3.56)
Gapist−1 0.289∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(23.67) (12.76)
Estimator Within Multilevel RE Within System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects - No - -
N 321697 321697 321697 321697
R2 0.073 0.134
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Clustered Standard Errors at the
2 digit industry level. All regressions include firm age and size (turnover and employment) controls.
8.2 At the Euro Area Level
Before studying the effect of the interest rate on the MFP gap at the common level, this segment
starts by seeing if there is enough evidence in the sample to distinguish between core and periphery
countries. If frontier firms were evenly distributed across countries, 5% of the firms in each country
would belong to the European frontier while the other 95% would be market followers. Figure 3
plots the share of firms in each country that belong to the European frontier in 2009 and 2018. In
both years, the shares of frontier firms in periphery countries are all below the 5% threshold. The
fact that this does not happen in the countries usually classified as core, might be indicative of MFP
differences at the firm level that have implications at the aggregate level. Thus, it is an indication
of how relevant studying the determinants of the productivity gap at the firm level could be.
Regarding the study of the signal of the interest rate effect, the results of the models described
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(b) Year of 2018
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution. The industries included are
the ones with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the NACE Rev. 2 system. The figure
compares the share of leaders as a percentage of the total number of companies in each country instead of looking at
the share of each nationality in the group of frontier firms because, due to missing data, some countries are less well
represented in the treated sample. The high percentage of frontier Dutch firms can also be biased by the type of firms
that are retained in the sample.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
Table 4: Interest Rate Effect at the Eurozone Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct
EuroAreaRt−1 -0.0129∗ -0.0163∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.00556+ -0.0513∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗
(-2.42) (-3.00) (-11.49) (-1.90) (-9.00) (-6.84)
Regulationct−1 -0.0105 -0.0140+ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(-1.04) (-1.96) (-7.50) (-5.15)
LegalSystemct−1 -0.0112 -0.0158 0.00422 0.0760∗
(-0.73) (-1.46) (0.20) (2.12)
Gapisct−1 0.301∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(43.05) (20.03) (23.57) (23.74)
Peripheryc 0.163∗∗
(2.77)
Estimator Within Within Within System GMM System GMM System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 797109 797109 797109 797109 797109 797109
R2 0.089 0.089 0.159
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Clustered Standard Errors at the country and 2 digit industry level. All regressions are weighted by the initial sample
share and include firm age and size (turnover and employment) controls.
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in section 6.2 are presented in table 4. The results are robust across specifications and indicate
that a decrease in the interest rate contributes to an increase in the productivity gap. Furthermore,
as additional variables are added to control for country institutional differences, the coefficient on
EuroAreaRt−1 increases in absolute value and gains significance. Therefore, the results of table 4
seem to be in accordance with the main hypothesis presented: a decrease is the interest rate could
widen the gap between market leaders and followers. Thus, the low interest rate environment could
be having negative consequences at the firm level, particularly for productivity dynamics of market
followers. Given the unequal distribution of frontier firms across the common market found in
Figure 3, this negative effect at the firm level could exacerbate country level divergence and help
explaining, at least in part, why the periphery struggles to converge since it joined the euro.
Regression (5) reinforces the conclusions drawn in favour of the main hypothesis. The positive
sign of the coefficient on the Periphery dummy indicates that being in a periphery country might
in fact increase the gap of a firm to the European frontier. This provides additional evidence for
the hypothesis that the aggregate divergence of periphery countries could be related to a significant
divergence of productivity at the firm level.
Concerning other factors that could be relevant in explaining differences across the EA, the
Regulation4 coefficient presents a negative sign: a higher score in the index should reduce the gap
between frontier and laggards. Since an increase in the coefficient means that a country has reduced
market regulation, the results indicate that adopting pro-market reforms could reduce the MFP gap.
On the other hand, the Legal System index is not robust across specifications.
9 Mechanism Validation
Table 10 contrasts the mean characteristics for frontier and laggard firms based on the MFP distri-
bution for the year of 2018. In both sectors, frontier firms have more employees, higher capital-to-
labour ratios, investment values and turnover. Moreover, they pay higher wages than other firms.
4A higher score in the Regulation Index means a less rigid credit, labour and business market with less restraints
imposed by the government. Countries with anti-competitive policies in place have lower scores in Regulation.
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Figure 4 compares the growth rates of the average value added per worker of frontier and laggard
firms in the total sample, separately for the manufacturing and services sector. In the manufac-
turing industry, while labour productivity of laggards firms increased from 2009 to 2018, the one
of frontier firms actually decreased, on average. Regarding services, even though the growth rates
are negative for both types of players, the decrease in productivity was stronger for frontier than
for non-frontier. This seems to indicate that, on average, firms within the eurozone are not neces-
sarily diverging, at least when cross-country differences are not controlled for. The same pattern
of growth emerges for Multi-factor productivity. When it comes to capital deepening (Figure 6),
while a divergence in the manufacturing sector is still not visible, the same cannot be said about the
services sector. Here, capital deepening is stronger for frontier firms. Thus, between this variable
and MFP, the latter seems to be the one driving the differences in value added per worker. If it was
not, then the fall in labour productivity would not have been so strong in the Services sector.
9.1 Aggregate Productivity and MFP Gap
Table 12 displays the results of the regression of Multi-factor productivity growth at the sectoral
level on the average gap between frontier and laggard firms in the same sector. Even though the
coefficient on the lagged value of the gap is not significant in all specifications, the negative coef-
ficient in the three columns provides evidence in support of the hypothesis of the model: a higher
average gap between followers and leaders can be associated with a lower MFP growth rate for the
sector. Thus, increasing distances to the frontier might bring lower aggregate growth.
9.2 Catch-up with the frontier
The results for equation 6 are shown in table 13. As expected, the coefficient on the distance to
the leader is positive across all specifications. Moreover, adding the interest rate in regression (2)
does not affect the coefficient on the gap. With the system GMM estimated in column (4), the
effect on the gap seems to reduce after including the interest rate, but the coefficient on the latter
is positive and significant. Thus, the results do not seem to support the hypothesis that the low in-
24
terest rate mechanism has affected the importance that technology spillovers have on MFP growth.
Firms further behind the frontier of this eurozone sample still seem to grow faster, at least without
controlling for country factors. Lastly, unlike what Andrews et al. (2016) conclude, the pace of
convergence does not seem do have reduced over the period. The coefficients on the interaction
terms with the time dummies are positive across three of the four columns, which indicates that the
effect might be stronger in the last two periods when compared to the base effect of 2009-2011.
9.3 Market Dynamism
Figure 7 confirms the leadership persistence predicted by the model. From 2011 to 2018, the
percentage of frontier firms that had been leaders two periods before increased from around 30% to
50%. In 2018, around 70% of the frontier firms were in the top 20% of the MFP distribution at time
t− 2. Concerning market dynamism, core and periphery countries experienced an increase in the
share of young firms, which goes against the reasoning of the model (Figure 8). Nonetheless, the
path of non-viable old firms is different for the two groups. The share of these companies seems to
have dropped in the periphery, while increasing in the core. As mentioned, without further analysis,
it is hard to say if a lower share of these companies signals a decrease of zombie firms, or higher
bankruptcy rates. Moreover, concentration measures in Figure 9 suggest a decrease in concentration
after 2009 (perhaps driven by the sovereign debt crisis), especially for the manufacturing sector,
followed by a slight increase in recent years. Finally, Figure 10 reveals that the increase in mark-
ups for frontier firms was particularly important in the manufacturing sector, but was not featured in
services. In sum, the leadership persistence hypothesis is backed by the data, while concentration
and market dynamism measures do not show the adverse scenario implied by the model.
9.4 Investment
Figure 11 compares the growth rates of the investment to value added ratio between frontier and
non-frontier firms, separately for manufacturing and services sectors. From 2009 to 2018, invest-
ment rates are similar for the two types of companies in the manufacturing sector. Nonetheless,
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panel (b) appears to indicate that investment rates were higher for market leaders in the services
sector. When it comes to other indicators, the investment ratio gap and the multi-factor divergence
measure display a positive correlation. Nonetheless, unlike what the model would imply, the cor-
relation coefficient is small (0.111). Table 14 displays the results regarding the implications for
sectoral investment. In general, the coefficients on the Investment to Value added ratio and MFP
gap are not significant. Moreover, while the former exhibits positive coefficients, the latter shows
a negative effect on Sectoral investment. In sum, even though the MFP gap might have a negative
impact on the Sectoral Investment ratio, the results are not significant and there is no evidence in
favour of negative aggregate consequences of an increase of the investment gap. An important
drawback of this analysis is that it does not account for other investment besides the one in tangible
fixed assets, leaving aside expenses on intangibles and on kinds of R&D (Corrado et al., 2006).
10 Conclusion and Discussion
Throughout this study, the model of Liu et al. (2019) was applied to the Euro Area with the aim of
understanding whether low interest rates could have an asymmetric impact on productivity growth
at the country and the Euro level. The empirical tests conducted provided evidence in favour of a
potential negative effect of low long-term interest rates for the convergence among EA countries.
Even though not all additional predictions of the model seem to hold, the Multi-factor productivity
gap between frontier and non-frontier firms seems to have a negative response to a decrease in the
long-term interest rate when looking at the period from 2009 to 2018.
If this mechanism is truly operating in the Eurozone, it poses a question to the approach aimed
at tackling the current pandemic crisis. Given the main hypothesis here proposed, unconventional
monetary policy measures to bring the shadow interest rate down could exacerbate the effects of the
mechanism, accentuating the differences between core and periphery countries, which are precisely
the ones that are being more hurt by the pandemic. Ultimately, it could result in a sluggish economic
recovery driven by increases in market concentration and lower investment.
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Appendices
A Additional Model Details
The Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equations for both firms in state s≥ 1 are:
rυs = πs +(κ +η−s)(υs−1−υs)+ max
ηs∈[0,η ]
{0,ηs(υs+1−υs− c)} (7)






In state zero, the HJB become:




Firm-level data is obtained using the private company datasets compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Firm-
level data for Portugal is sourced from the Financials dataset of Sabi. The information for Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain is obtained in the Financials dataset of
Amadeus, via the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). All data was retrieved in April 2020.
Sabi contains information on Spanish and Portuguese companies, while Amadeus comprises all
European Countries.
Regarding firm levels variables, the following were extracted individually for each country
from Sabi or BvD Amadeus Financials: ID Number; Close Date; NACE REV.2, primary code;
Consolidation Code; Year of Incorporation date; Tangible Fixed Assets; Number of employees;
Operating revenue (Turnover); Gross profit; P/L for the period [=net income]; Taxation; Material
Costs; Costs of employees; Depreciation; Interest paid.
The steps of cleaning and filtering the data for the research process were based on Gal (2013),
who provides a guide on how to measure productivity at the firm level using Orbis, the international
database also by Bureau van Dijk. The procedures adopted were the following: dropping duplicates
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in terms of year and id, and keeping consolidated accounts if it implies choosing between uncon-
solidated and consolidated financial information; dropping observations if the country code in the
BvD ID does not match the country’s ISO code; eliminating companies with negative values for
tangible fixed assets; dropping firms with less than 20 employees or missing values for the variable;
interpolating depreciation and fixed tangible assets values; dropping observations for which labour
or MFP productivity, number of employees, capital, capital ratio, materials and value added are in
the top or bottom 1% of the growth distribution.
Table 5: Sector and Country Level Variables
Variable name Description Source
Sector MFP TFP (VA based) index, 2010=100 EU KLEMS





GVA, volume 2010 ref.prices EU KLEMS
Value Added Deflator Gross Value Added Deflator,
2015=100
OECD detailed national Accounts
Investment Deflator Gross Fixed Capital Formation De-
flator, 2015=100
OECD detailed national Accounts
Intermediates Deflator Intermediate Consumption Defla-
tor, 2015=100
OECD detailed national Accounts
Long-term Nominal Inter-
est Rate
Long-term interest rate for conver-
gence purposes - 10 years maturity,
denominated in Euro
European Central Bank - Statistical
Data Warehouse
Inflation Rate HICP Annual average rate of
change
Eurostat
Regulation Index on a scale of 0 to 10, from the
most to the least regulated
Economic Freedom Rankings,
Fraiser Institute
Legal System and Prop-
erty Rights
Effectiveness of the protective func-
tions of government Index, on a





The use of the firm-level dataset for research purposes requires creating a set of new variables
needed for the analysis, including:
• Value added = gross profits + costs of employees = profit (net income) for the period +
Depreciation and amortization + taxation + interests paid + cost of employees;
• Labour Productivity = real value added divided by the number of employees.
• Starting value of real capital stock = book value of fixed assets deflated by the investment
deflator;
• Gross investment = annual change in book value of fixed tangible assets + depreciation,
deflated by the gross capital formation deflator.
• Capital Stock Kit = Kit−1(1−δit + It), using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) .
• Firm age = Current year - year of incorporation
• Concentration Index using the market share of the top 4 or 8 companies in each 2 digit sector
and year;
• Multi-factor Productivity (MFP) is estimated using a Cobb-Douglas production function
based on value added and with the number of employees and real capital stock as inputs,
having as reference the work by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). The production function is
estimated separately for each 2-digit industry but pooled across all countries, controlling
for country and year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the 2 digit level. As proposed
by Wooldridge (2009), the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin approach estimates the production
function by using intermediate inputs, in this case materials, as a proxy for unobserved pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, a 3rd degree polynomial containing 2rd and 3rd order combinations
of materials and capital lagged values, along with the twice lagged values of labour, act as
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instruments in the GMM estimation. Therefore, the identification issues regarding βl raised
by Ackerberg et al. (2015) are also addressed but in a one-step GMM.
• Mark-up computations follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). First, the authors compute
the wage share of the corrected value added. For the latter, the authors provide a Stata code
that first computes all the 2rd and 3rd order possible combinations of materials, labour and
capital values. Then, it estimates a regression of the value added on the polynomial that
results from the first step, including country, industry and year fixed effects. The residuals
that result from the last regression, are subtracted from the log value of the value added. This
way, the unexpected component of the value added is purged from the variable. Having the
corrected value added, one can finally compute the wage share first mentioned. The final step
to obtain the mark-up measures is simply to divide the βl obtained in the MFP estimation by
this wage share.
Variables are deflated using the OECD deflators from the ”Detailed annual National Accounts”
for Gross Value Added, Intermediate Consumption and Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the two
digit industry level. When a deflator is missing for a specific year in a two digit industry, the growth
rate of the subgroup above is used to compute an estimate for that year. If there are no values
available for the subgroup of the industry, the deflator for the value added of the total economy is
used. The same is done for intermediate consumption and investment.
D Interest Rate results - specification tests
D.1 Country level
When it comes to whether a fixed or a random effects model is the better choice for the data, the
Hausman test for each of the three countries rejects the null hypothesis of no systematic differences
between the random and the fixed effects coefficients. Thus, it is important to have in mind that the
random effects coefficients are likely to be biased when interpreting the results.
Regarding robustness, the correlation between the dependent variable and its lag should be
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computed to decide whether a dynamic model should be estimated or not. In the case of Gapisct ,
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient with the lagged value is 0.8888, 0.9061 and 0.9112 for Portu-
gal, Germany and Italy, respectively. The high correlation coefficients indicate that the dependent
variable is very persistent. Thus, accounting for AR(1) dynamics with a dynamic panel data model
is relevant to determine if the results are robust. First, the estimator used is a fixed effect estimator
to confirm the statistical significance of the coefficient on Gapisct−1 that can be verified in columns
(3) of tables 1, 2 and 3. Since the dataset is a small T but large N panel, the System GMM code
of Roodman (2009) based on the estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used to address the
potential Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981).
D.2 Eurozone level
Once again, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between the
random and the fixed effects coefficients. Thus, only the fixed effects estimator is computed.
For robustness, the correlation between the dependent variable and its lag should be computed to
decide whether a dynamic model should be estimated or not. In the case of Gapisct , the Pearson’s
correlation coefficient with the lagged value in the full sample is 0.9355. The high correlation
indicates that the Gapisct variable is very persistent, as one should expect since it measures the
productivity distance of a market followers to the technology frontier. Given the high persistence
of the dependent variable, a dynamic panel data model is estimated. First, the estimator used is a
fixed effect estimator to confirm the statistical significance of the coefficient on Gapisct−1 that can
be verified in column (3) of table 6. The estimator for the remaining steps is the System GMM as
in section D.1, for the same reasons.
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Table 6: Interest rate effect on MFP gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct Gapisct
Ageisct−1 -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.000272 -0.0000997 -0.0000442
(-4.36) (-4.56) (-10.06) (-0.97) (-0.46) (-0.19)
Age2isct−1 0.0000344
∗∗∗ 0.0000334∗∗∗ 0.0000184∗∗ 0.000000758 0.000000255 0.000000340
(3.72) (3.71) (2.72) (0.76) (0.31) (0.39)
Employeesisct−1 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0434∗ 0.0127 0.0103
(26.34) (26.23) (8.99) (2.58) (0.92) (0.71)
Turnoverisct−1 -0.292∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0980∗∗∗ -0.0959∗∗∗
(-33.01) (-33.12) (-16.66) (-10.25) (-9.28) (-8.80)
EuroAreaRt−1 -0.0129∗ -0.0163∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.00556+ -0.0513∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗
(-2.42) (-3.00) (-11.49) (-1.90) (-9.00) (-6.84)
Regulationct−1 -0.0105 -0.0140+ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(-1.04) (-1.96) (-7.50) (-5.15)
LegalSystemct−1 -0.0112 -0.0158 0.00422 0.0760∗
Gapisct−1 0.301∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(43.05) (20.03) (23.57) (23.74)
Peripheryc 0.163∗∗
(2.77)
Estimator Within Within Within System GMM System GMM System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 797109 797109 797109 797109 797109 797109
R2 0.089 0.089 0.159
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Clustered Standard Errors at the country and 2 digit industry level. All regressions are weighted by the initial sample















Notes: Period from 2009 to 2018. Firms from industry sectors with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes
from 64 to 66, in the NACE Rev. 2 system.
Table 8: Frontier and Laggard firms per country - Year 2009
Country Laggard firms Frontier firms Total
No. % No. % No. %
Austria 40 90.9 4 9.1 44 100.0
Belgium 7,762 90.1 855 9.9 8,617 100.0
France 23,260 97.2 675 2.8 23,935 100.0
Germany 19,825 95.2 994 4.8 20,819 100.0
Italy 30,216 96.5 1,100 3.5 31,316 100.0
Netherlands 2,058 58.2 1,480 41.8 3,538 100.0
Portugal 17,363 99.3 122 0.7 17,485 100.0
Spain 32,227 98.4 508 1.6 32,735 100.0
Total 132,751 95.9 5,738 4.1 138,489 100.0
Notes: Firms from industry sectors with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the NACE
Rev. 2 system. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution.
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Table 9: Frontier and Laggard firms per country - Year 2018
Country Laggard firms Frontier firms Total
No. % No. % No. %
Austria 980 77.4 286 22.6 1,266 100.0
Belgium 4,623 81.8 1,030 18.2 5,653 100.0
France 7,834 93.1 584 6.9 8,418 100.0
Germany 3,142 85.0 555 15.0 3,697 100.0
Italy 45,421 95.4 2,177 4.6 47,598 100.0
Netherlands 51 34.7 96 65.3 147 100.0
Portugal 10,089 99.0 105 1.0 10,194 100.0
Spain 26,978 96.8 905 3.2 27,883 100.0
Total 99,118 94.5 5,738 5.5 104,856 100.0
Notes: Firms from industry sectors with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the NACE
Rev. 2 system. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution.
Table 10: Summary Statistics for Eurozone firms (2018) - Frontier defined by Labour Productivity
(Value Added per worker)
Manufacturing Services
Laggard Firms Frontier Firms Gap Laggard Firms Frontier Firms GapVariables Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Stand. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Productivity 10.9 0.5 34752 12.1 0.4 2012 1.2∗∗∗ 10.7 0.6 42028 12.1 0.7 2309 1.4∗∗∗
Employees 161.3 1115.4 34752 280.3 2521.4 2012 119∗ 338.6 4731.4 42028 341.9 3232.8 2309 3.3
Capital-labour ratio 61.0 89.5 34752 159.8 274.4 2012 98.8∗∗∗ 42.3 91.2 42028 323.8 926.0 2309 281.5∗∗∗
Investment 2154.7 21331.6 34752 11817.9 184471.6 2012 9663.2∗ 3920.0 129956.9 42028 26113.0 269592.9 2309 22193.0∗∗∗
Turnover 46.5 366.4 34752 269.4 2684.5 2012 222.9∗∗∗ 69.8 807.1 42028 369.8 2461.5 2309 300∗∗∗
Markup (log) -0.0 0.3 34730 -0.0 0.4 2011 0.0 0.0 0.4 42027 -0.1 0.8 2309 -0.1∗∗∗
Wages 41.4 15.1 34752 63.7 22.9 2012 22.3∗∗∗ 36.4 18.5 42028 107.1 902.4 2309 70.7∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Averages are weighted by the sample share of each country. The sample contain firms from industry sectors with 2
digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the NACE Rev. 2 system. Frontier firms are defined
as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution. Productivity and Mark-ups are defined in logs. Wages,
Investment and the Capital labour ratio are in thousands of 2015 euros. Turnover is in millions of 2015 euros.
Table 11: Summary Statistics for Eurozone firms (2018) - Frontier defined by Multi-factor Produc-
tivity
Manufacturing Services
Laggard Firms Frontier Firms Gap Laggard Firms Frontier Firms GapVariables Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Stand. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Productivity 10.9 0.5 34730 12.0 0.5 2034 1.1∗∗∗ 10.7 0.6 41948 11.9 0.8 2389 1.2∗∗∗
Employees 132.0 816.4 34730 776.1 3964.2 2034 644.1∗∗∗ 237.7 2124.8 41948 2145.7 18081.0 2389 1908∗∗∗
Capital-labour ratio 63.2 95.1 34730 118.7 250.1 2034 55.5∗∗∗ 45.9 115.5 41948 247.2 875.3 2389 201.3∗∗∗
Investment 1663.3 16482.6 34730 19995.3 190418.6 2034 18332∗∗∗ 2130.9 24277.7 41948 57173.9 599401.5 2389 55043.0∗∗∗
Turnover 35.3 272.8 34730 455.0 2822.4 2034 419.7∗∗∗ 48.6 336.0 41948 736.0 3885.4 2389 687.4∗∗∗
Markup (log) -0.0 0.3 34708 -0.1 0.4 2033 -0.1∗∗∗ 0.0 0.4 41947 -0.1 0.7 2389 -0.1∗∗∗
Wages 41.3 15.0 34730 65.4 22.3 2034 24.1∗∗∗ 36.4 18.5 41948 104.8 883.7 2389 68.4∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Averages are weighted by the sample share of each country. The sample contain firms with at least 20 employees from
industry sectors with 2 digit codes between 5 and 82, excluding codes from 64 to 66, in the NACE Rev. 2 system.
Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution. Productivity and Mark-ups are
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(b) Services
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution at time t. The y-axis
represents log-differences from the starting year, which has been normalized to 0.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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(b) Services Sector
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution at time t. The y-axis
represents log-differences from the starting year, which has been normalized to 0.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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Services
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution at time t. The y-axis
represents log-differences from the starting year, which has been normalized to 0.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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E.3 Sector
Table 12: Consequences of MFP GAP for Sectoral Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
∆SectoralMFPst ∆SectoralMFPst ∆SectoralMFPst




Estimator Pooled OLS Within System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes - -
N 712036 712036 712036
R2 0.706 0.249
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. ∆SectoralMFPst
is the weighted cross country average of the Multi-factor productivity growth rate for sector s at time t.
AverageGapst−1 is the average gap between frontier and laggard firms across countries for sector s at time t.
All averages are weighted by the share of each country in the initial sample. Standard errors are clustered at
the industry level. Sample period from 2009 to 2018, including only firms with at least 20 employees.
E.4 Catch-up with the frontier
A possible concern for the identification of the coefficient on gapisct−1 in equation 6, is that
MFPisct−1. To correct for possible bias arising from this issue, column (3) and (4) in table 13
present the results of the Arellano-Bond estimation with gapisct−1 as a potentially endogenous
variable.
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Table 13: Convergence at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆MFPisct ∆MFPisct ∆MFPisct ∆MFPisct
∆MFPFsct 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗
(27.14) (27.14) (10.06) (8.39)
Gapst−1 (Base Effect) 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.00555∗∗∗
(65.81) (65.81) (10.51) (11.45)
Gapst−1∗2013-2015 0.00313∗∗∗ 0.00313∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗ 0.00125∗∗
(8.33) (8.33) (-8.25) (2.73)
Gapst−1∗2016-2018 0.00329∗∗∗ 0.00329∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ 0.000879+





Estimator Within Within System GMM System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 757824 757824 600880 600880
R2 0.336 0.336
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Sample period from 2009 to 2018, including only non-frontier firms with at least 20 employees.
Clustered Standard Errors at 2 digit industry and country level. All regressions are weighted by the
initial sample share and include firm age and size (turnover and employment) controls.
E.5 Market Dynamism










2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Frontier firms at time t by their status at time t−2
Top 5% Top 10 (but not top 5%) Top 20 (but not top 10%)%
´´
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution at time t.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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(b) Core
Notes: The graph is plotted after computing the share of young firms (aged 0 - 5 years), mature firms (5 - 10 years),
non-viable old firms (over 10 years and with at least two consecutive years of negative profits) and viable old firms (all
the others). Periphery countries include Italy, Portugal and Spain. The group of core countries is composed by Austria,
Belgium, France, Netherlands and Germany.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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Average MS4 Average MS8
(b) Services Sector
Notes: First, the market share of the top4 or top8 companies in the single market sample in each sector is computed.
Each of the lines is the weighted average (by the number of firms in each 2 digit sector) of those measures for the
manufacturing and for the services sector. The services sector sample does not include financial and public activities.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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(b) Services Sector
Notes: variables are not in logs.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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E.6 Investment
Running a regression between the investment ratio gap and the productivity gap might not be very
meaningful as the two variables might simultaneously influence each other. For that reason, only
correlations are computed. The Pearson’s Correlation coefficient between the Sector Investment
to Value Added Ratio Gap and Sector MFP Gap yields a value of 0.1112 with a p-value of 0.00.
Thus, the two variables, even though displaying a positive relationship, do not seem to be highly
correlated as one should expect.
Table 14 displays the results for the investment related regressions. Regarding robustness, the
correlation between the weighted average value of the MFP for each sector and its lagged value is
of 0.9134. Thus, an AR(1) model could be important to control for the persistence of the variable.
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Frontier firms Laggard Firms
Investment − Services
(b) Services Sector
Notes: Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% of the Multi-factor productivity distribution at time t. The y-axis
represents the percentage increase from the starting year, which has been normalized to 0.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Amadeus and Sabi databases.
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Table 14: Sectoral Investment and Investment Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SectorInv/VAst SectorInv/VAst SectorInv/VAst SectorInv/VAst SectorInv/VAst
AverageInv/VAGapst−1 0.306 0.280 0.280 0.126+ 0.126+
(0.95) (1.40) (1.40) (1.69) (1.69)
AverageMFPGapst−1 -5.138 -18.83 -18.83 -0.962 -0.962





Estimator Pooled OLS Within Within System GMM System GMM
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 252668 625592 625592 625592 625592
R2 0.688 0.064 0.064
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Sample period from 2009 to 2018, including only firms with at least 20 employees. Clustered Standard Errors at the 2
digit industry level.
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